Up until the new law was enacted, no lawyer representing any of the Station fire victims had entertained any settlement offer because there was a risk that a victim might forfeit millions of dollars in damages if a jury were to find a party that settled primarily at fault for the fire.

But now, with the new law, there would be less risk in a victim accepting pre-trial settlement offers because there would merely be a dollar-for-dollar write-off attached to whatever verdict is rendered at a trial. The degree of culpability will not be a factor in reducing a verdict for this special class of fire victims.

But that is precisely what Demaria and Ruggieri are objecting to.

In a memorandum of law filed with Senior U.S. District Court Judge Ronald R. Lagueux, they say that the 2006 law operates to the detriment of deep-pocket defendants in mass tort cases who may have very little culpability. If these large corporations choose to go to trial and have a jury weigh the allegations against them, they could face having to pay for close to 100 percent of the damages awarded, even if they are found to be only minimally at fault.

Demaria and Ruggieri declined to comment further this week when asked what their timetable for contesting the new law would be – and at what point they plan to do so. They could seek declaration of the constitutionality of the act before Lagueux and then appeal to the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals if the judge rejects their constitutional objections. But the appeals court could decide to wait to take up the issue until after the case is tried and damages are awarded.

While it is anticipated that other defendants who haven’t offered to settle may also join in the fight over the constitutionality of the new law, the defendants who have offered to settle or the victims’ lawyers could also ask Lagueux to take up the issue soon, in an effort to speed the settlement process.

The parties that have agreed to contribute to the proposed $13.5-million settlement are:

* Luna Tech Inc., of Alabama –and two of its European subsidiaries –which the lawsuits contend manufactured the pyrotechnics used by Great White the night of the fire.

* High Tech Effects Inc., a Tennessee company that is alleged to have sold the pyrotechnics used by Great White at The Station the night of the fire.

* Celotex Corp., which manufactured SoundStop board and then sold it for distribution to consumers. According to the lawsuits, the Derderians purchased SoundStop for their club from Home Depot and then installed it in the ceiling of the drummer’s alcove and elsewhere inside The Station.

* Triton Realty and Raymond Villanova, owners of the building on Cowesett Avenue where The Station was located.

* Joseph LaFontaine, of Warwick, owner of New England Custom Alarms, the company that installed the fire alarm system at the club when it was owned by Howard Julian, before the Derderians bought it.

The victims’ lawyers are asking Lagueux to appoint a special master who would devise a grid for apportioning the settlement proceeds among the plaintiffs. They are proposing that the court appoint Francis E. McGovern, a law professor at Duke University who has performed similar duties in mass tort cases more than 50 times.

Lagueux has scheduled a hearing for Oct. 18 to determine whether he will appoint a special settlement master.

DeMaria and Ruggieri say that if the victims’ lawyers want to hire someone as a private mediator to help them come up with a formula to impartially divvy up settlement proceeds, they have no objection. But they don’t want Lagueux to approve the hiring of a special master as an arm of the court or having him involved in the process of sanctioning what he does.

They assert that the court should decide whether the settlements are fair without input from a special master.

And, they say in their court filing that they don’t want to face the prospect of having to pay any of the fees that a special master might charge for his services.

The fire victims’ lawyers, they say, “have not demonstrated exceptional circumstances necessitating a special master.” And Lagueux, they say, has not indicated that he needs any assistance in approving any of the proposed settlements. They contend that “the court should continue its practice of insulating itself from settlement negotiations so that it can more easily conduct trials as they become necessary.”

The court, they say, “should consider the propriety of allocation only at the end of plaintiffs’ internal allocation efforts, when plaintiffs’ work –and presumably that of their internal consultant—is completed. The court need not otherwise be improperly drawn into the internal process of allocation, which could very well be contentious among counsel and/or parties seeking compensation.”