In July 2006 I filmed the operations of 1PPCLI from Edmonton, Canada as part of Operation Mountain Thrust. During a course of three weeks of fighting, under the leadership of LTC Hope, Taliban strong holds were disrupted or destroyed, while key elements of Taliban command and control, disrupted. A large part of the success of the Canadian's operations were based LTC Hope's ability to integrate the doctrine of unity of command within the battle space he controlled. In short, unity of command dictates a singular leader rather than multiple leaders or command structures competing for the same thing.

Afghanistan today is a myriad of military command structures. There is CSTC-A, CJTF-VI, ISAF / NATO, CJTF-101, and CJSOTF, all acronyms for what is otherwise an alphabet soup of jurisdiction. In short, there lacks a single "supreme commander" for operations in Afghanistan. Depending on which command structure a unit falls under, dictates to a large degree how and to what extent they can function as a war fighting unit or as something other. This division of command is an unprecedented departure from the unity of command doctrine that has been the back bone to US military success.

In August of 2006 the US began the process of handing over control to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) / ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). The acronym ISAF allowed for the non-NATO allied countries that were involved in security and war fighting efforts in Afghanistan to be included in the new command structure. The plan to hand over control to NATO/ ISAF had a key failing point: command and control.

NATO as a structure was created by the US as a way to stall a Russian advance into Western Europe while the US mobilized troops to lead the fight. NATO was never developed to be a deployable force. Backed by US money, military forces and equipment, the US became the thread that unified the entire organization into a working organization. The challenges that faced NATO were a reflection of Europe as a whole, defined by separate countries, with individual identities and histories that were unable to unify under a singular governing body.

Prior to August 2006, all nations involved in the operations in Afghanistan were subject to US control. The transfer of authority to NATO/ ISAF not only created a separate command structure, but it was done in phases, so that regionally, NATO/ ISAF controlled operations separate from the US commanded regions. The lack of singular command created gaps in strategic planning and response. As the process has continued, those gaps have been exploited by the Taliban allowing them to resurge and gain momentum once again.

Adding complication to all of this was the manner in which most NATO member countries sold the idea of the war in Afghanistan to their publics back home. While the US considered Afghanistan a war, most NATO and ISAF countries proclaimed it to be a "peace keeping" mission. The semantic differences have become critical in defining the limitations each participating nation has with respect to involvement in actual war fighting actions.

What I have found is that most soldiers share the same belief. They are soldiers, and as part of their job and duty, they are expected to fight the wars that nations fight. They accept risk, they accept death, and through their training they are given the tools to face those moments with little hesitation. Ultimately, the soldier fights or dies not for the glory of politics and flags, but for the love and respect for the man on his left or right. It is part of the brotherhood.

Sadly, what has resulted in Afghanistan are two wars: the war on the ground and the war of politics. Those who live in the dust and grime each day know what they are here for... to fight a war, to fight the Taliban, to uphold the values of the country they represent. But when politics began crossing lines with military operations, dictating from afar how this war must be fought, it has tied the hands of the commanders on the ground and put in question the sacrifices that each of these soldiers makes.

What begins in the back rooms, behind closed doors at long tables, ends with the individual on the ground, in a place far from his home, fighting for a war and for himself, bound by the ideals of his country yet restricted by the motives of people more concerned about their popularity, career and re-election back home.

And while the politicians use their talking points to expound on the purpose of the war, the duration, the safety of our troops, the need to preserve human life, what they are not saying is that war is hell. War is about sacrifice, courage, honor. It is also about loss, pain, and death. A soldier knows that better than most. Binding his hands to the rules created by multiple commands and political constituencies does nothing more than put him at risk to an enemy that seeks only one thing: to kill him.

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