Kabul- In the early evening on Monday, 23 May 2006, gun fire erupted some 2000 meters east of Camp Phoenix. Initial reports stated that the incident was a conflict between two illegally armed Afghan groups. Base alarms were sounded, as people scurried to bunkers and safe zones. US Army security force personnel (SECFOR) took up positions around the compound as the intermittent gun fire continued over the course of several hours. Once the conflict was contained and details began to arrive, the reality of the incident took on a totally different image, serving as an example of the complex and fluid environment here in Afghanistan.

The gun fire that was heard and which resulted in the temporary closure of Camp Phoenix did not originate from two illegally armed Afghan units, but from two American funded, privately contracted security forces that were fighting over control of one another's compounds. One of the firms involved was Dynaco, a private military contractor based in Fort Worth, Texas, that provides security for Afghanistan's President Hamed Karzai; the other firm was reportedly the Palm Beach, Florida based Wackenhut Corporation. The engagement began around 5 pm local time. As the fighting continued, Afghan National Police were dispatched, only to be repelled by the two combating forces. Pulling back to regroup, additional security forces were reportedly dispatched, quelling the incident and bringing order back to the area. Three Americans were among those arrested, with one foreign national treated for wounds to the leg. No US military personnel were reported wounded in the fight. Media reports, however, have listed this as an Afghan incident, adding fuel to the belief that the Taliban are on the rise and that the US efforts are losing ground.

Later that night around 3 am local time, an Afghan long haul truck, known as a Jingle truck, was found to have an IED strapped to its under carriage. An Explosive Ordinance Disposal team (EOD) was dispatched to try and diffuse the explosive. Their attempts were not successful so the truck and the IED were destroyed. Jingle trucks have traditionally been controlled by the Afghan warlords. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, the US Army and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) have relied on Jingle trucks to transport goods throughout the country. However, rather than work with warlords, US military command has contracted these services with independent Jingle truck operators. The annual contract for these operators is due to be renewed in less than a month. Following from several other incidents in the country where Jingle trucks have been destroyed, this latest incident is suspected to be an attempt by a competing operator to gain contract leverage in the upcoming negotiations.

This is part of the evolving reality Afghanistan, a country that is still, for a large part, tribal based. As it struggles to mature, Afghanistan is burdened by divisions between its people that are made both ethnically and regionally, while tribal warlords struggle to maintain their control. The warlords have been the traditional leaders of a particular ethnic group and region, controlling their areas like small countries within the larger geographic region we recognize as Afghanistan. Power for these men is determined by the quantity of property owned, both real estate and material goods, as well as their ability to defend their holdings. Winters here are harsh, summers extremely hot, so with Spring thaw not only is there renewal in nature, but renewal in fighting as the warlords attempt to expand and defend their property base. As one warlord rises and another falls, allegiances switch quickly as both a warlord's subjects and fighters scramble to maintain their wealth, and share in the few resources that are available. From the American perspective this often seems as if loyalties have little meaning; for the Afghans, the sway in loyalty is a matter of business and personal survival. Loyalty for the Afghan is to their land, and their religion. Everything else is business. It is a process that has gone on for thousands of years.

In an effort to communicate the message of the conflict here in Afghanistan, both US and international media simplify the complexities of tribal, ethnic and regional disputes in black and white terms. The term Taliban is used to describe nearly every incident of violence in the country. For the US reader, this singular-enemy story has worked to promote a view that the US efforts are falling short, as supposed Taliban forces seemingly amass and move to reclaim ground. In recent editorials both in the United States and overseas, these claims persist, as arguments are made that the Taliban are on the rise and that the United States is working to get out of Afghanistan by passing the threats and dangers off onto ISAF forces, all the while failing to contextualize the current state of affairs in terms of the political, ethnic and contractual elements that are shaping and influencing the present situation in Afghanistan. These elements can be broken down into categories such the vulnerability of newly elected unifying government, the destruction of poppy fields and the drug cartels response, foreign fighters fighting the infidel, the propaganda used by anti-government forces (AGs's), and the post 9-11 agreements to aid and rebuild Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has not offered the drama of Iraq. Politically, the operations in Afghanistan have been sanctioned by the United Nations, as a direct outcome of the events of September 11, 2001. Since that time, the stories of US operations in Afghanistan have not only fallen from the front page, they have until recently fallen out of the news entirely. The few articles that have appeared continue to make reference to Taliban or al-Qaida forces as the only forces operating in this theatre. This simplicity is understandable since the lack of coverage fails in both time and column space to effectively build the story and background necessary to appreciate this area's complexities as well as its successes. The other war, Iraq, that is so heavily debated, therefore, becomes the umbrella under which both wars are judged. In simple terms, Afghanistan is not Iraq, anymore than an abacus is a calculator.

What has been transpiring in and around the southern city of Kandahar is a good example. In January, the US Army stated its expectation that the Spring Offensive of 2006 would be more aggressive than past years. The prediction was based not just on the resurgence of Taliban forces, but on the activities it was tracking both internal and external to Afghanistan as well. "Taliban," therefore, has become a catch all phrase, lumping together various elements and factions into a singular category. As I suggested above, while this may prove effective in communicating a direct and simple message to the world, it also distorts the situational reality that the American and ISAF forces are facing. The result is a public perception of the war here, with both its successes and failures, that is out of touch with this reality. An example is the coalition forces Spring offensive. Here the British were put in charge of destroying poppy fields throughout Afghanistan. The project was proclaimed a success, even though only ten percent of the fields were destroyed. Yet, even with such a small percentage of the fields eradicated, response from the drug cartels has been swift, hiring their own militias, and even Chechnyan snipers in response. All of these fighters have been generalized as Taliban.

The Kandahar region is primarily composed of the ethnic group known as Pashtun. This group extends in between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Here again the simplified media message works to mislead US readers, as the US government walks a tight rope of political agendas. With Saudi money, schools have been constructed on the Pakistani side, where young boys are recruited and educated in traditional muslim values. From these schools, Pakistani intelligence has been recruiting fighters and sending them into Afghanistan. Many refer to themselves as Mujhadeen. This regional fight has a long and turbulent history, fueled by the politics of modern day that include interests in the oil and gas reserves yet to be tapped in Afghanistan. Pakistan naturally denies any claims, and the US skirts the issue for fear of upsetting the delicate relationship it has built with the current Pakistani regime; not to mention the precarious relationship it holds with Saudi Arabia. The media spin, however, is always the same,"Taliban on the rise in southern Afghanistan." So when the President of Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai makes the claims that Pakistan is training and funding fighters to destabilize southern Afghanistan, the lack of US support for such public claims leaves the impression that his new government is generating excuses for its inability to unify the south. Let us not forget, Karzai's government is a unifying government only recently established in the post 9-11 era.

There are Taliban in Afghanistan. They continue to leverage their positions through fear, false promises and their economic leverage from narcotics. They have also been very effective in what the military terms "I/O" or information operations, exploiting the military's own message to their advantage. While the US military command has supported a singular-enemy media campaign, the relatively small forces of Taliban, mixed in with the variety of foreign fighters and drug cartel backed militias, have found unity in the singular enemy message that talks of their numbers in terms of a greater force than they actually are. Additionally, this simplified message has only added strength to the insurgents internal I/O efforts as they rally unaligned forces under the common banner of ridding the country of the "infidel;" a banner which is easy to exploit with the extremist Muslim elements throughout the region.

The recently completed operation, Mountain Lion, spear headed by the US Army's 10th Mountain Division is yet another example of a success that is portrayed as losing ground. This operation successfully pressured the insurgent elements, channelling them and bringing them out into the open. While the engagements have been more intense, the key point is that coalition forces have been rooting out the insurgent elements, literally taking the fight to them, rather than waiting and letting the insurgents do the same in return. As difficult as it is for the public, especially the US public, to accept the realities of war in this era, the fact is that fighting an enemy you can see is far better than taking losses from the enemy that hides behind IED's and tactics of fear. This method of warfare, which has saturated our news coverage from Iraq, has a limited footing here in Afghanistan; the additional hope with operations such as Operation Mountain Lion, is to keep it that way.

The United States is now in the midst of a transfer of majority power and control of operations in Afghanistan to ISAF forces. In a US editorial this transfer was actually referred to as a strategy to minimize US exposure, passing the burden off onto the coalition body. This transfer, rather than being lauded by US media, should be applauded as an example of a successful US cooperative effort to support and sustain the country of Afghanistan. From the beginning, the US operations in this country were sanctioned by NATO, the UN, and countries outside of our normal political channels. Afghanistan has continued to function that way, as the international community, including the G8, have developed strategies to share the burden and responsibility of assistance for this countries development. The transfer of power to ISAF forces, while effectively reducing the US presence here, is part of a greater plan that was agreed upon several years in our past. Sadly, the majority of the US public remains in the dark on most of what has transpired here.

Afghanistan has its challenges, as does any developing country. One soldier offered a quote the other day that helped frame the efforts here, "As a country, we [the US] were not so different in the beginning. We had governmental disorder, lack of unity, and threats from outside powers for the first 100 years, yet the US public seems to think that our job should be completed and that this country should be self-sustaining in under five years." The people of Afghanistan hold hope, but they fear that all that has been started will not be sustained, and that the international community, especially the US will retract from its promises under pressure from the US public. That impression has grounds for reason in light of the not so distant history of the Mujahdeen and the fickle US support following the withdrawal of Russian troops.

As I write there are less than one hundred media representatives registered with central command. Out of those, the number of US journalists can be counted on one hand. The news that is shown on US reports comes primarily from outsourced local media agents, or from compilations of file footages with a new story line. The bottom line is that the story here in Afghanistan is not being told. Sadly, Afghanistan represents a major success for the US, but those achievements are being lost in the polemics of Iraq, or overlooked altogether. There is an important story to tell here, to understand, and to document. This is a complex environment, defined by the harsh conditions in which these people live. Simple messages only work to bridge misunderstandings, obscuring the on the ground reality and the reasons that bring these soldiers here.

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Copyright, Scott Kesterson- 2006

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